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Abstract
Digital Platforms impose organizing logics on
ecosystems. Dependent on their configuration, they
enable certain practices, relationships, and value
distribution among actors while preventing
alternatives. Incumbent platforms often have a strong
power to implement contested configurations since
they control access to attractive user groups/markets.
However, emerging platforms have a small degree of
bargaining power in relation to key actors since they
have not yet achieved such a position. Although
numerous studies detail governance strategies for
incumbent platform ecosystems, research on how
platform providers navigate competing concerns in
emerging platform ecosystems remain rare. We report
on a study of the establishment and continuous
dynamics of a digital platform used for service
innovation. We inductively identify a pattern of the
dynamics in this navigation process, locate four salient
tensions driving these dynamics, and provide insights
on how the platform provider navigated them.

1. Introduction
Digital platforms, i.e. the “software-based products
or services that serves as a foundation upon which
outside parties can build complementary products or
services”
[1:5]
provide
organizations
great
opportunities for value creation. However, we are only
starting to grasp the processes through which digital
platforms emerge and establish a significant user base
[2]. The literature on platform governance has largely
focused on strategies to stimulate the development of
services, coordinate and monetize the activities of
distributed and heterogeneous actors participating in
established digital platform ecosystems [3-6]. A salient
theme in this body of research is the tensions resulting
from the interactions of competing actors and platform
owners in relation to different concerns. Examples
include tensions related to identity [7], standard-
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variety, control-autonomy and collective-individual
[4]. For the provider, a key strength of the platform as
an organizing logic is the ability to unite and
coordinate agents in the ecosystem towards its strategic
goals [8]. These agents may have distinct
understandings of the current situation, conflicting
goals, and incompatible ideas of how to advance the
ecosystem, which we here refer to as competing
concerns. Most studies examining platform governance
strategies and the effects on the wider ecosystem have
tended to focus on how platform providers address
competing concerns in established platform ecosystems
[6, 9]. Thus, extant research details the strategies of
incumbents such as Apple, Google, or Intel in
leveraging their market position and strategic control
over key resources to influence an ecosystem. Such
studies build on the premise that, as an owner of a
central enabling bottleneck, the platform owner’s
power and bargaining position often greatly exceeds
that of independent suppliers of complementary
components [10]. Platform owners will often have
“bouncer’s rights” [11] to grant or deny access to the
system and stipulate conditions associated with
admittance. These empirical settings have provided
insights into governance of third-party developers in
platform ecosystems and choices regarding a
platform’s economic scope and scale [10].
However, establishing an ecosystem is significantly
different from reinforcing an incumbent ecosystem.
Unlike an incumbent platform ecosystem with a
relatively stable value proposition and user base, an
emerging platform’s value can be uncertain and
obscured since it is often tightly connected to the user
base and interactions in the ecosystem. Emerging
platforms, with unstable user bases, will often have
relatively small bargaining power or strategic control.
i.e. the influence exerted on other members [12] since
the value of the “bouncer’s rights” is dependent on the
size and attractiveness of the entire ecosystem.
Although incumbent digital platforms do not retain full
control over design decisions [5], emergent platforms
are likely to meet distinct challenges when enforcing
change and managing competing concerns. The
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emphasis on mature and industry-leading platform
ecosystems has led to a lack of knowledge of the
processes and mechanisms through which platform
providers deal with competing concerns during
platform establishment. An increased understanding of
governance dynamics in emerging platform ecosystems
can help provide insights into the design of digital
platforms [2]. Against this backdrop, this research
explores how competing concerns shape the trajectory
of nascent digital platform ecosystems.
To this end, we report on a case study of a
platform, Trafiklab, an initiative aimed at fostering an
ecosystem of data providers and developers engage in
developing digital services based on public transport
data. Our analysis reveals multiple cycles of recurrent
challenges to the status quo and associated responses.
We provide a process model of the dynamics of
platform establishment where new sociotechnical
configurations arise from, and give rise to, tensions
related to competing concerns. We provide insights
into the emergent nature of this process.

2. Digital Platform Establishment
Digital platforms provide infrastructures for
interactions between disparate groups, enable re-use of
core components that provide functionality for
peripheral modules, and coordinate the associated
ecosystem through sociotechnical resources such as
pricing, rules and boundary resources [3, 5, 13, 14].
Since they impose organizing logics, platforms can
broadly be understood as meta-organizations that
coordinate agents in a wider system [8]. The design of
sociotechnical resources is the main vehicle through
which a platform provider influences its ecosystem i.e.
third-party
applications
and
complementors
participating to create value based on a platform’s
interfaces [1]. Through the design of technological and
social resources, a platform provider can specify
decision rights, control how the platform is used to
create services, and structure incentives to encourage
or discourage certain actions by users in the ecosystem
[1].
A platform’s life cycle consists of three phases: (1)
emergence of an ideal solution, (2) progression along a
technology maturity curve, and (3) its uptake by group
of prospective end-users [1]. Although the emergence
phase is inherently fragile and can define the fate of a
platform, few studies explore platform strategies and
their dynamics in this phase. Strategy-oriented
literature on platforms generally high-light pricing
policies, such as subsidies and premium fees, to kickstart, or “ignite”, a platform [14, 15]. By subsidizing
prospective users, a new platform entrant can draw on

initial users to attract others [15]. This perspective
builds on the premise that once the platform “ignites”
by attaining a critical mass of users, it becomes selfsustaining [16]. Literature has also explored nonpricing incentives such as timely notifications of
changes affecting modules (e.g.- apps) as essential in
attracting users and increasing the quality of external
applications [17]. Developers may multi-home across
multiple platforms, the capability to search for ways to
distribute and monetize services in the ecosystem is an
essential aspect in enriching a platform’s innovation
habitat [18]. Degrees of openness and control is
another widely acknowledged design consideration
whereby deliberatively and progressively relinquishing
control, a platform owner allows external actors to
build complementary components that extend the
platform ecosystem [10]. Labelled as coring, a set of
technological and business functions entrants need to
grow an ecosystem has been suggested [19]. Examples
of these functions include ensuring that the platform
serves a relevant function for an industry, ensuring
dependence between components and protecting its
core source of revenue [19]. Although the notion of
coring includes a high-level description of what
functionality new platform providers need to offer,
how such functions are operationalized when
establishing digital platforms has received limited
attention.

2.1. Competing Concerns and Digital Platform
Ecosystem Governance
Establishing a new platform involves reconfiguring
organizing logics and relationships across multiple
organizations and actors in an ecosystem. A new
platform carries distinct structures for how to arrange
and conduct exchanges as technical elements are
coupled and new types of interactions among agents
are facilitated. As such, it brings together multiple,
distributed actors with different perspectives that need
to be reconciled for the platform to become an
accepted de facto standard. The structural
configuration of digital platforms is, however, not
static. Rather, it is subject to recurrent challenges from
the distributed set of actors in the wider system of use
[5, 20]. This is partly due to the malleability of digital
technology that “exhibits a procrastinated binding of
form and function [21] meaning that new capabilities
can be added after a product or tool has been designed
and produced” [22:1399]. Thus, the existing
arrangement of resources and power within ecosystems
continues to evolve throughout the lifetime of a digital
platform, leading to disputed designs, unintended
consequences and tensions i.e. differing, conflicting
and competing demands within, and across,
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stakeholders [23, 24]. A platform provides digital
resources, such as APIs, that are shared among a large
set of users. Control over their use is distributed across
multiple stakeholders and contexts [20]. Fluidity of
resources poses significant tensions for the platform
providers. For example, tensions can arise from distinct
perspectives on the standards and quality of service
that can be generated across the ecosystems or
negotiating an optimal level of control that the
platform provider can institute to provide flexibility to
coordinate autonomous actors across the ecosystem
[4]. Established platforms are often able to exercise
significant degrees of control to increase predictability
of individual behavior and ecosystem trajectories.
Based on the interactions among their accumulated
user bases, they can generate an understanding of the
nature of these interactions and governance
mechanisms and draw on methods such as pattern
recognition (e.g., Netflix can recommend content based
on similar users). Moreover, a platform’s potential
merit is largely emergent, arising in-vivo since it is
tightly connected to the user base and interactions in
the ecosystem. Understanding the types of interactions
and value that the platform offers to users is
challenging for emerging platforms with relatively
small user bases. Not least since prospective platform
users may generally postpone adoption or only partly
commit until the value and participation of other users
is realized [25].
Given that a platform’s sociotechnical design is
prone to evolve over time, and is subject to different
re-combinations, platforms can draw on distinct
degrees of architectural leverage in production,
innovation, and transaction [26]. Production leverage
describes how platforms enable reuse of core assets
and, through interfaces, allow sharing of these with
actors in the ecosystem, thereby enabling economies of
scale and scope. For example, Apple and Google
provide the architectural base of APIs that enable
developers to create applications interoperable across
wider ecosystems. Innovation leverage also refers to
the sharing of resources, but for innovative purposes
through recombination and specialization [27].
Innovation leverage arises from digital platforms’
capacity to facilitate learning and creativity by
converting search from distant to local [28]. The search
for innovative solutions and knowledge resources is
path dependent as satisfying actors, in general, will
draw on previous connections, experiences, and
knowledge i.e. explore options in the "local" domain.
Such a search is more cost-efficient since it leverages
the actor's current expertise, routines, cognitive frame
and absorptive capacity, with the risk of better
alternatives not being considered [29]. Distant search
i.e. exploring options further away from the actor's

own practices and knowledge entail greater search
costs. Transaction leverage refers to the intermediary
role platforms play in enabling transactions of various
kinds by providing infrastructure for interactions and
exchange, thereby increasing efficiency and reducing
search costs. In digital platform ecosystems, these
exchanges are naturally founded on information
transactions. An example is how Airbnb facilitates
transactions between users by reducing the search time
required for lease and rental apartments.
As digital platforms provide resources that are
dynamic and a function of human appraisal [30], they
enable new actors across the ecosystems to engage in
practices that promotes their interest as they seek to
create value. As actors may hold different beliefs about
the platform’s potential value, e.g. due to information
asymmetries [13], the platform provider is susceptible
to different and contradictory responses as external
actors gradually shape an understanding of valuecreating interactions through trial-and-error practices.
During such learning processes, ecosystem actors are
likely to discover and engage in practices that deviate
from current practices, making tensions salient, and
potentially contradictory by revealing plurality,
scarcity or hitherto unrecognized changes [4]. Plurality
in the context of digital ecosystems refers to the
availability of similar options while scarcity arises
from competition regarding specific resources. A high
degree of change in emerging platform ecosystems,
results in uncertainties regarding economic returns
from investments and opportunistic behavior.
Providers are therefore required continuously adapt to
the needs of actors while dealing with uncertainty in
the technological trajectories. For emerging platforms,
due to their relatively smaller influence over resources
across the ecosystem, these uncertainties can subject
the platform provider to contradictory practices as they
seek to alter and re-align themselves with multiple
identities and practices of actors in the ecosystem [7].
To explore how tensions arising from competing
concerns and shape the evolutionary trajectory, we
conceptualize digital platforms as an evolving set of
sociotechnical resources, carrying distinct architectural
leverage, varying over time, and enabling different
types of connections among constitutive modules and
agents.

3. Research Design
We studied Trafiklab, a start-up in the public
transport industry in Sweden, launched in September
2011 by a group of Public Transport Operators [PTOs]
led by Samtrafiken. Trafiklab aims to serve as a hub
for PTOs, providing open data and APIs to developers
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and public transport users. It has an overarching goal
of facilitating the development of digital services based
on public transport data. Between 2011–2017,
approximately 3000 users registered, 2200 services and
prototype applications were developed. To this end,
Trafiklab was deemed a suitable study object since it is
currently in the developing phases of the platform life
cycle. Semi-structured interviews, internal reports, and
weblogs were used as data sources. In total, we
conducted 48 interviews and used 29 internal
documents and blog posts. Interviews were conducted
between 2015–2018. The overall duration of the
interviews was 36 hours, with an average interview
time of 1 hour 5 minutes. As we were interested in
exploring concerns and actions dating from Trafiklab’s
inception, interviewees selected needed to have
knowledge regarding Trafiklab’s inception and to have
been involved at decision-making levels that affected
Trafiklab’s trajectory.

3.1 Data Analysis
Our data analysis was guided by an inductive
approach, following an initial coding phase, focused
coding and theoretical coding [31]. First, an initial set
of interviews were transcribed and openly coded using
atlas.ti. Open coding involves “attaching a code or
label that summarizes and accounts for each piece of
data” [31: 43]. In our case, this involved attaching a
code to sections of the transcribed interviews or
document that indicated a concern (e.g. alternatives or
competing options or dilemmas that confronted
Trafiklab in advancing the ecosystem) and potential
actions taken in response. The first round of coding
was descriptive and broad as we sought to gain an
empirical understanding of the case while being open
to exploring our studied phenomenon. Second, in later
rounds of interviews we investigated further concerns
and actions that occurred frequently in the data. These
subsequent interviews explored in detail how specific
actions taken were related to resolving an identified
issue. The material was analyzed through “focused
coding” [31: 57] in which frequently occurring codes
identified in the initial open coding were used to
support, synthesize and explain larger segments of
data. In doing so, we focused on specific actions
Trafiklab took towards resolving those concerns. To
ensure we had not missed any relevant aspects, we
used the initial concerns and actions identified to
develop a timeframe of actions and concerns with
which we held further interviews with four data
providers exploring their views of those concerns.
Based on further interviews, proposed minor changes
were made to some concerns we had identified and
their timing. Based on this, we reworded codes,

merging some together. For example, codes related to
standardizing data formats, upgrading APIs, data
integration etc. were broadly categorized under the
label “data quality”.
Thirdly, once we had identified concerns that were
relevant and for which Trafiklab took actions to
address, we held further interviews with employees
who could be knowledgeable about these identified
concerns. In doing so, we described the concern in
terms of the successive actions Trafiklab took. For
example, Trafiklab wanted to advance certain
technically-related functions of the platform by
reaching out to users through informal meetings e.g.
meet-ups or using newsletters. We then explored why
this was necessary. For example, codes that labeled the
different ways Trafiklab reached out to users and
providers through Meet-ups or hackathons, and using
their support forum, were grouped under the core
category interactions. Through multiple iterations and
discussions between the authors, we examined
relationships between the different core categories,
exploring trends of the changes through axial coding
[31]. The outcome is the general process patterns
described in figure 1, and the details of how this
process evolved described in the following.

4. Navigating Tensions from Competing
Concerns
Figure 1 below shows an inductively identified
iterative process generated from our analysis in which
the platform provider sought to navigate competing
concerns and associated tensions in the establishment
of an ecosystem. The process logic in the model is such
that emergent practices among distributed actors result
in tensions i.e. new inconsistencies are generated, or
become salient, contradictory or disabling [4].
Tensions trigger a new platform configuration (i.e.
sociotechnical structures constituted by the platform
core, complementary resources, and couplings to
modules and actors in the ecosystem) to materialize.
The new platform configuration induces a value logic
(i.e. specific composition of architectural leverage i.e.
production, innovation and transaction [26]) guides
interactions i.e. exchange of various kinds between
actors in value creation processes based on information
transactions and exposure to diverse resources. For
Trafiklab, we found this pattern to repeat in multiple
cycles described in phases 1-4. Below, we describe
phases characterized by the identified tensions that
triggered these dynamics, and how the platform
provider sought to navigate them.
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Figure 1. Platform dynamics

4.1. Phase 1: Internal vs. External service
development
The launch of Trafiklab in September 2011 was
ignited by a practical concern: the failure of major
PTOs to adjust daily operational routines and services
(e.g. customer support, communications, delivery of
services) swiftly to changes brought about by the use
of smartphones. Third-party developers resorted to
scraping data from PTOs websites, in order to develop
smartphone applications for users of public transport.
Samtrafiken, a joint venture aimed at coordinating and
strengthening public transport services owned by 38
PTOs, made initial efforts to adapt so that it could
coordinate service development with third-party
developers. This was unsuccessful as developers felt
that Samtrafiken’s desire to retain control restricted
them, resulting in low take-up of these alternatives and
a continued preference to scrape the PTO data. The
PTOs were left with the options of either making
improvements to their existing services or shutting
down third-party services entirely. Shutting down other
applications based on scraped data was not feasible
since these were based on publicly available, open
data. This was a problem for the PTOs since issues
with these applications, such as incorrect use of
information or low-quality programming, could result
in poor or faulty information to public transport users.
This triggered the need for an alternative that would
address both the developers’ concerns and those of the
PTOs. As the manager of Trafiklab explained:
“If we did not develop this platform, third-party
developers would still build applications using our
data. We wanted to offer a structured process where
developers could develop services that would not
conflict with our own services, because we had initially
experienced problems when developers-built services
using scraped data.” [Trafiklab Manager]
Instituting new sociotechnical design changes:
Settling for the option to steer developers away from
scraped data to an alternative service development
model resulted in the creation of Trafiklab, a platform
to coordinate the activities of third-party developers
and PTOs. The initiative involved the development of a
transformation layer: an architectural layer for data
filtering and standardization that provided a shared

resource for future actors joining Trafiklab. For
Trafiklab, the architectural layer acted as an incentive
to entice data providers to the platform, since APIs
could be tested and exposed to third parties without
them incurring the full cost of developing a proprietary
layer. The transformation layer provided potential
developers an alternative to scraped data as it offered a
filter function that transformed and generated multiple
data formats. The purpose was to provide an agile
environment for developers, reducing the time and cost
involved in accessing data. The idea was to align
Trafiklab with the developers’ “culture”, distinguishing
it from bureaucratic public transport, and to provide a
better option than scraping data from different PTOs.
As the manager explained:
“In the beginning, we use the transformation layer
to develop APIs that were more suitable for developers
to create services rather than data scraping.”
[Trafiklab Manager]
Incentivizing participation to enable value
exploration: As Trafiklab attracted developers and
data providers, it built on these initial users to further
consolidate its user base through different incentives.
For example, prizes were awarded to developers
participating in innovation competitions. Through
travel hacks, specific tasks were assigned to developers
to explore possible services. For example, an App
Contest to create apps for disabled travelers focused on
addressing the needs of the deaf and blind travelers.
Trafiklab partnered with other institutions in
organizing travel hacks. This served as a way to attract
developers and data providers, and, inform
stakeholders of the potential value in public transport
data. As explained by the manager:
“We have arranged travel hacks together with
other institutions.….as a way to attract developers to
look at new kinds of services…and to keep
stakeholders informed of our work” [Trafiklab
Manager]
Stimulating interactions between data providers
and developers: To address user needs better and
encourage enrollment on the platform, Trafiklab
facilitated open interactions between data providers
and developers aimed at knowledge-sharing among the
initial users. Besides using its support forum, the
Trafiklab Meet-ups were particularly valuable for
engaging with users. Thus, a network of developers
and data providers could share experiences and ideas
on using Trafiklab at workshops and physical
meetings. An added advantage of meet-ups was that
developers interacted directly with data providers.

4.2. Phase 2: Stability vs. Adaptability of
platform resources
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As Trafiklab grew over time, it became apparent
that the initial set of resources e.g. APIs available on
its platform significantly limited the developers. This
realization was largely related to the recognition that
most application prototypes did not result in large-scale
services and could not easily adapt to frequent changes
associated with APIs. To remain relevant in the
ecosystem, Trafiklab needed to move beyond the mere
publication of data and, demonstrate the potential
value, which they reckoned could further expand the
user base and scope of the ecosystem.
“To make the ecosystem around Trafiklab grow, it
was not enough to make an app prototype... We wanted
professional apps … Initially, we focused on providing
APIs for third-parties…But this limited the options that
developers could use the APIs for.” [Business
Strategist]
Adopting new sociotechnical resources to scale
services: Realizing that it needed to expand its user
base and scale of services, Trafiklab made a concerted
effort to develop APIs with functionalities and formats
interoperable with other data formats used across
developer communities. There was a recognition that,
despite the strength inherent in the position as a
national hub, Samtrafiken and Trafiklab could not, and
would not, benefit from imposing their own technical
practices. Thus, Samtrafiken and Google started a
collaboration to provide data through APIs supporting
the GTFS (General Transit Feed Specification), a data
format used by Google Transit for applications within
public transport.
“Samtrafiken had a collaboration with Google. We
provided our data for Google to publish. We launched
GTFS files, the global standard format for public
transport data.…it is easy for developers to when using
our data.” [Trafiklab Manager]
Leveraging ecosystem relationships to support
value creation: As Trafiklab shifted from providing
access to data to developing APIs for data formats
interoperable with other formats used across
developers' communities, the existing relationships
with data providers became an increasingly valuable
resource that they provided developers with. Trafiklab
initiated a first line of support, which involved support
for third-party developers in response to questions e.g.
updates related to an API that required a swift
response. Given Trafiklab’s knowledge about the
personnel working in the different PTOs, it leveraged
this position to forward inquiries swiftly to appropriate
people with specialized knowledge about the problems
raised, in case Trafiklab did not have the competency
to provide a definite answer to the developer. In doing
so, Trafiklab simplified things for developers and
further strengthened its position as a more agile
environment responding to developers’ needs.

Leaning interactions towards future changes:
Given that changes in data format could, in some cases,
be planned but in others be unforeseen as services
scaled across other data formats, Trafiklab provided a
roadmap to developers of possible directions that
future services and APIs might take. Trafiklab
communicated APIs updates to specific affected
developers through newsletters. Although these
changes could be communicated in the developer’s
forum, some cases involved data providers who did not
use the support forum. Overall, these measures aimed
to provide a sense of direction for developers and
ensure interoperability of services across different data
formats.
“...we keep developers updated of specific changes
on APIs that will affect their work” [IT support staff]

4.3. Phase 3: Quality vs. Quantity of services
developed
As Trafiklab attracted more developers and
increased the number of different data formats for the
development of services, it witnessed the challenge of
controlling and ensuring the quality and variety of
services. This concern affected both data providers and
Trafiklab. For Trafiklab, this could jeopardize the
relationship it had with providers as they could be wary
that their data was being published wrongly or used by
developers in unacceptable ways, which could cause
problems for public transport users.
“The main risks we are facing is that customers are
using services we cannot control and if these services
are shut down, or not updated, it becomes tricky for us
to take care of all customers dependent on the service.
[PTOs] might think we are the cause” [Trafiklab
Manager]
Matching sociotechnical resources with service
standards: To ensure the output of services was of
better quality and of an acceptable standard, developers
had to sign agreements before they could start working
on the APIs. In this way, Trafiklab could shut down
applications considered inappropriate according to the
standards, an action they rarely undertook, as
developers could resort to scraping data as these data
were publicly available. Samtrafiken’s earlier attempts
to control third-party development through restrictive
measures had ended unsuccessfully. A key
management system with API keys was thus used to
ensure control and maintain service quality.
“developers need to sign up for APIs keys and,
agree on how the data is used. We can shut down
services that break those terms.” [Head of IT]
Incentivizing participation and value through
progressive access: Trafiklab developed a progressive
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scale for access by different developers through the
key management system, a level of access that could
be extended based on the adoption and usage of the
applications developed. By instituting a progressive
scale, Trafiklab saw this as an incentive for developers
to develop better services or risk being restricted to
lower levels of requests and APIs access. Such
incentives were a component in Trafiklab’s continuous
ambition to move beyond prototype apps and reduce
load in its backend systems.
“The bronze level is 10,000 requests/month, the
silver is 100,000, the gold is 10-12 million… This is an
incentive for developers to move to the next level and
for us to control traffic in our backend systems...” [IT
support]
Matching interaction and access with output of
services: Beyond service agreements, control of third
parties and service quality was also achieved using
different levels of access to ensure access and service
quality varied according to the quality of the developed
applications and the usage of the services developed.
Different configurations of APIs were embedded as
part of the key management system. API Keys were
matched to the projects of developers. This provided
feedback and monitoring of the output of specific
projects and usage of an applications.

4.4. Phase 4: Resource efficiency vs. Scaling
capacity of platform resources
As Trafiklab had attained the initial objective of
creating an environment for developing services,
attracting about 3000 users, and having 2200
developed services, it sought to ensure that its
ecosystem of developers and data providers was
sustainable for a long haul both in terms of efficient
utilization of resources and scaling the services
developed. This was in recognition of the fact that
developers benefited little financially from the initial
services developed as they engage largely in hobby
projects with low capacity to scale. Options were
considered to enable developers to sell tickets through
smartphones. Trafiklab’s view was that both
developers and data providers could be attracted to the
platform in the long-term through network effects
triggered by APIs that would enable ticket sales.
“Developers can’t sell tickets…developers could
create more services if they can make money from the
services. The only way they can make money is to
involve them in new ways of selling tickets.” [Business
Strategist]
The decision to enable a monetary base for
Trafiklab was, however, a concern for PTOs, who
wanted to keep control over this domain. The idea of

ticketing was also problematic from Samtrafiken’s
perspective, given that it required service agreements
with other stakeholders, a political process requiring
resources and technical competences. For example,
systems to handle validation of tickets, and a mandate
from different PTOs needed to be negotiated. Apart
from being unsuccessful in realizing the idea of APIs
with the functionality to handle the sale of tickets,
Trafiklab faced an unexpected event in its ecosystem.
SL, a key data provider for Trafiklab’s ecosystem,
decided to move to a new proprietary platform to
handle
data transformation
internally.
Data
transformation had become critical for SL’s core
business and it needed to ensure control and align the
system with its organizational needs.
“SL bought new systems to transform APIs. Instead
of being a shared resource, the new systems are in
their control. The transformation layer became critical
for SL’s core business… [Trafiklab Manager]
Streamlining sociotechnical resources: The
decision by SL to move to a proprietary platform
created profound and unforeseen consequences for
Trafiklab. The transformation layer had, up until now,
been one of Trafiklab’s key resources, but maintaining
it to filter fragmented data and test new APIs became
costly and its value was questioned as providers
developed proprietary solutions. Thus, Samtrafiken
decided to shut down the transformation layer.
“There were lots of different issues regarding the
transformation of data. It was costly to maintain given
the resources we had. So, we shut it down.” [Business
Strategist]
Refining self-identity to passively sustain
ecosystem: The removal of the transformation layer
resulted in a loss of control for Trafiklab as access to
APIs of key actors became restricted. It became
difficult for smaller actors to join Trafiklab. The layer
was a gateway for transforming data and an entry point
to the ecosystem for data providers to test and explore
the benefits of APIs before committing.
“To have small actors joining Trafiklab now, they
need to build new API systems. This is an entry
barrier. Before, they could test APIs by connecting
their internal APIs systems with the transformation
layer. Now, they have to build the layer on their own,
which is costly.” [Trafiklab Manager]
SL’s departure and the shutdown of the
transformation layer challenged Trafiklab’s identity.
To some, Trafiklab was a marketplace, to others a
brand, a community for developers. Evident was that
Trafiklab’s role and identity was less clear.
“We´ve had lots of question about our work. We
needed to change. Now, Trafiklab is a brand, a
marketplace. It’s a community for developers. There
are many views.” [Business Strategist]
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5. Discussions
Most studies examining competing concerns and
resulting tensions do so from the vantage point of an
incumbent platform provider [3, 19]. Described as
platform leaders, prior literature uniquely positions
these incumbents as powerful actors in the ecosystem
through the “bouncer rights” they exercise via control
of strategic resources [6, 10, 13]. However, how
providers navigate competing concerns and resulting
tensions, in emerging platform ecosystems has
received little attention.
Based on our analysis of Trafiklab, we propose a
process model of the dynamics involved in this
navigation process (see figure 1). The model focuses
on how (a) tensions from competing concerns or
inefficiencies in existing/alternative solutions trigger
materialization of a (b) platform configuration. We
suggest that a platform configuration (i.e. the
sociotechnical structures constituted by the platform
core and its couplings to modules) emerges in response
to tensions based on perceived inefficiencies,
appreciation of alternative solutions or divergent
interests. The platform configuration suggests a value
logic. (c) The value logic (i.e. specific composition of
architectural leverage in production, innovation and
transaction [26] may or may not have been foreseen in
the design. Types of leverage are not mutually
exclusive, rather different configurations enable
different amount and types of the three logics. For
example, in the Trafiklab case the core value logic
shifted with the removal of the transformation layer,
from an emphasis on innovation leverage to a
transaction-oriented logic. The value logic guides (d)
interactions among actors in the ecosystem. From the
emergent practices and adaptive behavior arising
through interactions and appropriation of the value
logic, new tensions are triggered. For platform
providers, it is a salient challenge to understand the
types of interactions they guide users toward. The
actors in the ecosystem are gradually shaping an
understanding of value creating interactions through
trial and error practices. During the course of such
learning processes, ecosystem actors are likely to
engage in practices that trigger new tensions.
Our study demonstrates that emerging platform
providers have a relatively low strategic leverage to
influence the trajectory of a platform and ecosystem.
Given the need to legitimize and scale activities across
the ecosystem, emerging platform providers align with
incumbent actors whose actions expose the platform to
vulnerabilities. As illustrated by the departure of key
actors and removal of the transformation layer in our
case, the emergent nature of order creation in complex

systems [32] might lead the provider to unassumingly
implement new configurations (in responses to
tensions) that alters the architectural leverage and
questions the platform’s identity. These findings
suggest that emerging platforms should adopt
strategies enabling them to diversify their value logic
and operate across multiple ecosystems rather than
focusing on one key actor or ecosystem [18]. We
identified four salient tensions, each characterizing
different phases in Trafiklab’s trajectory, and
associated responses driving these dynamics. Below
we discuss these four tensions, how they shaped
Trafiklab’s trajectory, and attempts to navigate them.
Consolidating and coordinating autonomous
actors: As the value of platforms is partly related to the
size of the user base, attracting the first actors in the
ecosystem is a salient challenge. A platform provider
needs to balance disparate interests so that each
relevant group finds the value logic compelling enough
to adopt the platform. The control vs. design options
tension poses a challenge for platform providers as
potential users, due to the uncertainty of the new
platform can be reluctant to embrace it. Trafiklab
sought to consolidate ecosystem actors by leveraging
an architectural layer that provided resources aligned
with developer’s interests, while still providing a sense
of increased control towards data providers. Trafiklab
had a relatively weak bargaining position as developers
could turn back to their data scraping practices if the
value logic was not attractive enough. Thus, Trafiklab
largely focused on aligning with developers by e.g.
simplifying search and access to data, providing
incentives such as prizes to developers to explore APIs.
Our study suggests that while access and control
provides a platform provider leverage to influence
actors in the ecosystem [6], enabling value-driven
lock-ins is another potential governance mechanism.
Trafiklab’s focus on consolidating users by designing
boundary resources more compelling than the
scrapping option is an example of such value-driven
governance. Also, Trafiklab’s boundary resources were
not restricted to APIs but also included social resources
to spur interactions among developers. The importance
of these interactions suggests that social boundary
resources requires more attention in research.
Ensuring stability vs. adaptation of platform: In the
early stages of a platform, the user base provides not
only resources but also feedback and ideas informing
discovery of, and decisions on, strategic design options
[33]. Observing actions and engaging in interactions
with distinct user groups facilitate discovery.
Simultaneously, innovation in the larger technological
environment might generate other attractive options to
scale the user base. However, an essential tenet in
platform architecture is to keep the core stable and
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maintain a relatively low degree of adaptations of
interfaces to minimize disturbances for peripheral
modules. This challenge is not unique to emerging
platforms but rather applies to all platforms carrying
non-trivial degrees of digital components that must be
adapted relatively frequently due to the rapid pace of
external innovation. However, users of emerging
platforms are likely to devote less resources to track
changes in interfaces and adapting their modules. At
Trafiklab, the response from interactions within and
across actors provided feedback on potential
advantages
and
disadvantages
of
certain
configurations. Adaptation to achieve scaling of the
platform’s services was largely based on the
developers’ perspective but with the ultimate aim of
generating end-user services that could scale and prove
the value of the ecosystem to all actors. To mitigate
drawbacks of frequent technical adaptation, Trafiklab
devoted substantial resources to communicate technical
changes to key actors. In line with prior studies, our
case suggests that communicating planned changes can
incentivize developers to update and refine services,
thus building the user base of a platform [34].
Managing quality vs. quantity of services
developed: Digital platforms are valuable because they
create opportunities to engage distributed actors.
Striking a balance between quality of the services
while not overly constraining access and freedom to
variety, is a key tension that platform providers face.
For Trafiklab, tracking the quality of services
generated by users was a key measure to handle this
tension. The platform resources were configured to
provide incentives through different degree of access to
the platform for developers based on the services they
created. Since the value of Trafiklab’s “bouncer right”
was still relatively weak, these incentives mainly came
in terms of carrots rather than sticks.
Managing resource efficiency vs. Scale capacity:
While potential platform providers and ecosystem
actors can initially share a common goal driven by a
common vulnerability, efficient utilization of resources
in the long-term to scale a platform as it evolves
remains challenging. Because of the dependence on
key actors for resource provision, platform providers in
emerging ecosystems might be attracted, to resolve this
tension by adapting socio-technical resources in ways
that comprise their interest. In our case, the platform
provider scaled down sociotechnical resources as key
actors departed from the ecosystem, resulting in a
platform reconfiguration that increased the adoption
cost for other actors to join the ecosystem. The
outcome was a shift of the value logic from an
emphasis on innovation through shared resource
integration, to a transaction-oriented logic where
facilitation of knowledge exchange became dominant.

This had implications on the platform’s ability to
actively govern the ecosystem not only because it
effectively hindered supply-side growth of the
ecosystem, but also came to challenge the platform’s
identity. Because the identity and use patterns in early
phases of a technology is highly open for interpretation
by users [35], relatively minor changes in design might
have significant impact on their trajectory.

6. Conclusion and Future Work
Our research at Trafiklab shows that a platform’s
configuration has significant implication for the value
logic presented to prospective users, the interactions
facilitated and the distribution of value in the
ecosystem. Platforms that have not reached a critical
mass of users remain weak, as the costs associated with
losing access to the ecosystem for actors that choose to
fully or partly abandon the platform are relatively low.
The weak bargaining power suggests that emerging
platforms become vulnerable in regard to tensions
perceived by key users, which might result in these
users changing their relationships with, and the use of,
the platform. The dependency on key users might also
lead platform providers to redesign a platform in ways
not aligned with their long-term strategy. When
evaluating such options, providers need to consider
how changes in platform configurations can lead to
significant change patterns. Our study is situated in the
domain of public/private collaborations, focusing on a
platform engaged in the provision of open APIs and
public data. Thus, regulations and competing concerns
might be particularly salient in this context. The
importance of these contextual specifics requires
further attention.
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